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Abstract
We introduce increasing returns to scale into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model
with capital, and study the determinacy and E-stability of Taylor-type interest rate rules. With
very mild increasing returns supported by empirical research, the conventional wisdom regarding
the design of interest rate rules can be overturned. In particular, the “Taylor principle” no longer
guarantees either determinacy or E-stability of the rational expectations equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that self-fulfilling expectations may cause business fluctuations if there are certain
types of coordination failures in the markets. In the real business cycle (RBC) literature, researchers
emphasize the importance of increasing returns in generating such fluctuations (Farmer and Guo,
1994). Increasing returns are usually originated from externalities or monopolistic competitions.
Coordination failures also have important implications for economic agents who do not possess
rational expectations and try to learn about the economic structure adaptively. With increasing
returns, the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) may not be “expectationally-stable” (E-stable)
under learning (Duﬀy and Xiao, 2003). The recent literature of monetary policy design, however,
emphasizes the role of interest rate policies in either facilitating or restraining fluctuations caused
by self-fulfilling expectations or E-instability. It is believed that if an interest rate policy is properly
designed, it leads the economy to a determinate (free from self-fulfilling fluctuations) and E-stable
REE (Clarida, et al., 2000, Bullard and Mitra, 2002). Determinacy and E-stability have undoubtedly
become two crucial criteria in evaluating monetary policies (Evans and Honkapohja, 2003).
Interestingly, when selecting the proper interest rate rules to prevent excess volatilities, re-
searchers prefer to condition on an economic environment that is free from any market coordination
failures. In other words, the possibility that both sources of indeterminacy and E-instability exist in
the economy has been largely neglected. For example, there are extensive studies of the potential
benefits and risks associated with Taylor-type interest rate rules. Yet when specifying the economic
environment for these studies, researchers seem to ignore the possibility of increasing returns, which
are known to cause indeterminacy and E-instability. The workhorse for this area — the New Key-
nesian model, has monopolistic competitions, staggered prices, but constant returns to scale. Since
increasing returns are widely believed to occur in monopolistically competitive economies, one nat-
urally wonders how robust the current findings are if the assumption of constant returns to scale
does not hold. Indeed, to some researchers, one is “required” to postulate increasing returns in a
monopolistic competition framework, since it is the “only way to account for the absence of sig-
nificant pure profits in the United States economy” (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995). Therefore,
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incorporating increasing returns into the designing of interest rate rules seems the next logical step
to take in extending this research.
In this paper, we propose a first step towards such an extension. We introduce increasing returns
to scale into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital, and study the determinacy
and E-stability of Taylor-type interest rate rules, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Bullard and Mitra’s
important finding is that if the interest rate rule follows the so-called Taylor principle, the REE of
the model is mostly likely to be both determinate and E-stable. The Taylor principle asserts that
the monetary authority must adjust the short-term interest rate more than one-for-one with changes
in inflation. Our research question is: when there are increasing returns in the economy, how must
the interest rate rules be changed to achieve a stable macroeconomic equilibrium? Does the Taylor
principle still guarantee the determinacy and E-stability of the REE?
Our major findings are as follows. We re-examine the determinacy and E-stability of REE under
four variants of the Taylor rule studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002). The four variants are: 1. the
contemporaneous data rule, 2. the lagged data rule, 3. the forward expectations rule, and 4. the
contemporaneous expectations rule. Bullard and Mitra (2002) find that in most cases the Taylor
principle is suﬃcient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability. Moreover, with rule 1 and
rule 4 a determinate REE is always E-stable and vice versa. We find that with small increasing
returns that are consistent with empirical estimates, these findings no longer hold. In particular,
the Taylor Principle cannot guarantee either determinacy or E-stability in any of the four rules. In
some cases, a less than one-for-one response of the interest rate to inflation can lead to determinacy
and E-stability. The policy implications are clear. To rule out indeterminacy and E-instability, it
is critical for the monetary authority to identify the level of increasing returns — given a certain
level of increasing returns, a distinct set of parameters for the interest rate rule will maintain the
determinacy and E-stability of the REE.
The assumption of increasing returns to scale is widely considered in the business cycle and
growth literature.1 A major problem of models that possess indeterminate equilibria is that the
1See, among others, Hornstein (1993), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Roternberg and Woodford (1995), and Ben-
habib and Wen (2004).
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required increasing returns are too high to live up to empirical tests. In empirical studies, the earlier
work of Hall (1990) is known to have over-estimated the degree of increasing returns (larger than
1.5). More recent research find mild but significant levels of increasing returns in the US economy.
For example, Basu and Fernald (1994 and 1997) conclude that the returns to scale is between 1.03
and 1.09. Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) use stock market data to estimate the returns to scale
and obtain values between 1.09 and 1.11. In our model, the required level of increasing returns to
generate indeterminacy is as low as 1.05.
In general, this paper adds to a series of other research that study the limitations of the Taylor
Principle as a criterion to design interest rate rules. Gali et al. (2004), for example, find that the
existence of rule-of-thumb consumers will render the REE indeterminate when the Taylor principle
holds. Fair (2003) argues that the Taylor principle cannot guarantee determinacy if aggregate
demand responds to nominal interest rates and inflation has a negative eﬀect on consumption.
Benhabib et al. (2001) find that the Taylor principle does not necessarily lead to determinate REE
when there is zero bound on nominal rates. All these works focus on the determinacy of the REE.
We have not seen any papers that challenge the role of the Taylor principle in maintaining the
E-stability of the REE.
In the literature, the baseline New Keynesian model ignores endogenous variations in capital,
on the ground that capital fluctuations do not correlate much with output at the business cycle
frequency (McCallum and Nelson, 1999). However, a number of researchers have recently pointed
out that certain topics can only be studied when capital is allowed to vary endogenously.2 In our
context, increasing returns in capital are known to have non-trivial eﬀects on the determinacy of the
equilibrium. For example, Benhabib (1998) illustrates that self-fulfilling expectations about future
investment returns are important in generating indeterminate equilibrium. Grandmont et al. (1998)
show that the capital-labor substitutability aﬀects the robustness of sunspot equilibrium. Moreover,
with endogenous capital, our model becomes a natural extension of Farmer and Guo (1994), which
2Gali et al. (2004) show that endogenous capital is required for rule-of-thumb consumers to make a diﬀerence in
system dynamics. Christiano et al. (2001) use investment adjustment costs to generate hump-shaped response of
output to a monetary shock. Edge (2000) shows that investment adjustment with a time-to-build technology helps
generating a liquidity eﬀect.
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ensures that the same mechanism that causes indeterminacy in their paper still exists in the New
Keynesian framework. We therefore incorporate capital into the model in this study. We introduce
capital in a standard way, as in Gali et al. (2004). In our analysis, we compare a constant-return
version of our model with Bullard and Mitra (2002)’s labor-only model to make sure that introducing
capital alone does not alter the determinacy and E-stability of the REE. All changes in the REE
properties are caused by incorporating increasing returns to scale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the micro-founded model frame-
work and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 discusses the methodology and calibration
of the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A New Keynesian Model with Capital and Increasing Re-
turns
This is a standard New Keynesian model with capital, except for the novel assumption of increasing
returns in production. We abstract from any exogenous processes, such as productivity shocks
or demand shocks, in order to minimize the number of equations to manipulate when deriving the
conditions for E-stability analytically. Adding or leaving those processes do not change the properties
of the equilibrium.
2.1 Households
The economy is composed of a large number of infinitely-lived consumers. Each of them consumes
a final good Ct, and supplies labor Nt. Savings can be held in the form of real money balances MtPt ,
bonds Bt, and capital Kt. Consumers seek to maximize life-time utility
E0
∞X
t=0
βt[
C1−σt
1− σ + γ
(Mt/Pt)1−b
1− b − v
N1+χt
1 + χ
],
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where σ, γ, b, v, χ > 0 and 0 < β < 1, subject to a budget constraint
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+ It =
Wt
Pt
Nt +
Mt−1
Pt
+
Rt
Pt
Kt + (1 + it−1)
Bt−1
Pt
+Dt (1)
and the capital accumulation equation
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + φ(
It
Kt
)Kt. (2)
Hence, the consumers receive real labor income (Wt/Pt)Nt, and real capital rental income
(Rt/Pt)Kt. Bt−1 is the quantity of riskless one-period bonds carried over from period t − 1 which
pay out interests at a nominal rate of 1 + it−1. Dt are dividends from ownership of firms. Mt−1/Pt
are real money holdings carried over from period t − 1. The consumers spend their income on
consumption Ct, new money holdings Mt/Pt, new bond purchases Bt/Pt, and new investment It.
Capital adjustment costs are introduced through the term φ(It/Kt)Kt, which determines the change
in capital stock induced by investment spending It. We assume φ
0 > 0, and φ00 ≤ 0, with φ0(δ) = 1
and φ(δ) = δ as in Gali et al. (2004).
The first order conditions for the consumer’s problem can be written as
vNχt = C
−σ
t
Wt
Pt
, (3)
C−σt = γ(
Mt
Pt
)−b + βEtC
−σ
t+1
Pt
Pt+1
, (4)
1 = βEt(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + it), (5)
Qt = βEt(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ{Rt+1
Pt+1
+Qt+1[(1− δ) + φt+1 −
It+1
Kt+1
φ0t+1]}, (6)
where φt+1 = φ(It+1/Kt+1) and φ
0
t+1 = φ
0(It+1/Kt+1), respectively. Qt is the real shadow value of
capital, i.e., Tobin’s Q. This is defined as
Qt =
1
φ0( ItKt )
. (7)
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Given our assumption about φ, the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Q is
− 1φ00(δ)δ = η.
2.2 Firms
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing diﬀerentiated intermediate
goods. The latter are used as inputs by a perfectly competitive firm producing a single final good.
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
The final goods are produced by a representative, perfectly competitive firm with a constant returns
to scale technology
Yt = (
Z 1
0
Y
ε−1
ε
jt dj)
ε
ε−1 , (8)
where yjt is the quantity of intermediate goods j used as an input, and ε > 1 governs the price
elasticity of individual goods. Profit maximization yields the demand schedule
Yjt = (
Pjt
Pt
)−εYt, (9)
which, when plugged back into (8), yields
Pt = (
Z 1
0
P 1−εjt dj)
1
1−ε . (10)
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market features a large number of monopolistic competitive firms. The
production function of a typical intermediate goods firm is
Yjt = (K
α
jtN
1−α
jt )
θ, θ > 0, (11)
whereKjt and Njt represent the capital and labor services hired by firm j. The parameter θ measures
the level of returns to scale. When θ = 1, the production technology reduces to the constant-return
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Cobb-Douglas production function. When θ > 1, the intermediate goods firm has increasing returns
to scale.
The firms’ real marginal costs ϕjt is derived by minimizing costs:
ϕjt =
1
(1− α)θ
Wt
Pt
Njt
Yjt
=
1
αθ
Rt
Pt
Kjt
Yjt
, (12)
which in turn implies the optimality condition
Kjt
Njt
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
. (13)
Note that when there are constant returns to scale, (12) and (13) imply that the real marginal costs
ϕct are given by
ϕct =
(1− α)α−1
αα
RatW
1−α
t , (14)
which is equalized across all firms since there is no j in the expression. When there are increasing
or decreasing returns to scale, a firm’s real marginal costs are associated with its production levels.
In this case we can define the average level of marginal costs as
ϕt =
1
(1− α)θ
Wt
Pt
Nt
Yt
=
1
αθ
Rt
Pt
Kt
Yt
. (15)
Using (12), (13), and the demand schedule, we can relate the real marginal costs of a firm ϕjt to
the average level of marginal costs ϕt as
ϕjt = ϕt(
Pjt
Pt
)
ε(θ−1)
θ . (16)
Intermediate firms set nominal prices in a staggered fashion, according to the stochastic time
dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983). Each firm resets its price with probability 1 − ω each
period, independent of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. A firm resetting its price
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in period t seeks to maximize
Et
∞X
i=0
ωiβi(
Ct+i
Ct
)−σ(
P ∗t
Pt+i
Yjt+i − ϕjt+iYjt+i), (17)
where P ∗t represents the (common) optimal price chosen by firms resetting prices at time t.
Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is
Pt = [ωP
1−ε
t + (1− ω)P ∗1−εt ]
1
1−ε . (18)
2.3 Monetary Authority
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate it every period according to a simple linear rule
contingent on information about output and inflation. Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we
consider four variants of the interest rate rule. The first variant is called the “contemporaneous data
rule”:
it = φππt + φyyt, (19)
where φπ ≥ 0 and φy ≥ 0. This is the original Taylor rule that conditions the interest rate on current
output and inflation rate.3 Since current data for output and inflation may not be available at time
t, some suggest a “lagged data rule”:
it = φππt−1 + φyyt−1. (20)
The third rule is called “forward expectations rule”:
it = φπEtπt+1 + φyEtyt+1, (21)
3 In the standard New Keynesian model without capital, the interest rate rule conditions on output “gaps” rather
than on output levels. It should be noted that the properties of the REE will not change whatsoever if output gaps
are replaced by output levels in those models. We use output levels because output gaps cannot be easily derived in
a model with endogenous capital.
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where central bankers use the market’s expectations about the future to set the interest rate rule.
The fourth rule is called the “contemporaneous expectations rule”:
it = φπEt−1πt + φyEt−1yt, (22)
where the underlined assumption is that the market does not have current data and attempts to use
past data to estimate today’s output and inflation.
2.4 Equilibrium and Reduced Linear Systems
The following conditions clear the factor and goods markets: Nt =
R 1
0
Njtdj, Kt =
R 1
0
Kjtdj, Yt =R 1
0
Yjtdj and Ct + It = Yt.
We need to derive the linearized versions of the key optimality conditions in order to conduct
our analysis. We use lower case letters to denote linearized variables. There are six non-dynamic
equations and four dynamic equations. The first equation is the linearized version of the labor supply
schedule (3):
χnt + σct = wt − pt. (23)
The second equation is the linearized version of (7), which defines Tobin’s Q:
xt − kt = ηqt, (24)
where, to avoid confusion with the nominal interest rate, we have denoted investment by the letter
xt. The third and fourth equations are the linearized versions of (12). We are interested in the
average level of marginal costs, which are given by
ϕt = nt + (wt − pt)− yt, (25)
ϕt = kt + (rt − pt)− yt. (26)
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The fifth equation is the linearized production function
yt = αθkt + (1− α)θnt. (27)
The sixth equation is the market clearing condition
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
xt, (28)
where C, I and Y are steady state levels of consumption, investment and output. The first
dynamic equation is Phillips curve, which is derived by solving the firm’s dynamic price-setting
problem and combining it with (18). The equation is given by
πt = βEtπt+1 +
κ
1 +A
ϕt, (29)
where κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)ω and A =
ε(1−θ)
θ .
The second dynamic equation is the linearized version of (6), which describes the evolution of
Tobin’s Q:
qt = βEtqt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]Et(rt+1 − pt+1)− (it −Etπt+1). (30)
The third dynamic equation is the Euler equation (5), which can be linearized as
ct = Etct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1). (31)
The last dynamic equation is the capital accumulation equation (2), which is linearized as
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + δxt. (32)
Finally, we add the interest rate rule and use the non-dynamic equations to substitute out seven
variables qt, wt − pt, rt − pt, xt, it, ϕt, and yt. The system becomes a four dimensional linear
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diﬀerence equation system consisting of zt = (ct, nt, kt, πt) :
zt+1 = Jzt. (33)
3 Methodology and Calibration
3.1 General Methodology
Next, we examine the determinacy and E-stability of four variants of the Taylor-type interest rate
rules. For each variant, the determinacy of the REE is decided by computing the eigenvalues of the
system (33). Since there is only one predetermined variable kt, an REE is determinate if the number
of explosive roots is three and the number of stable roots is one. If the number of stable roots are
bigger than one, we have an indeterminate REE. If there is no stable root, the system is explosive.4
To study adaptive learning, we re-write the system as
bzzt + bkkt = dkEtkt+1 + dzEtzt+1, (34)
kt+1 = ezzt + ekkt, (35)
where the second equation is derived from the capital accumulation equation that does not involve
any expectations and does not need to be learned. We assume agents have the perceived law of
motion (PLM)
zt = a+ ψkt,
which is in the same form as the MSV solution under REE.5 The parameter vectors a and ψ will
have to be learned. Given this PLM, we calculate the forward expectation of zt as
Etzt+1 = a+ ψEtkt+1 = a+ ψEt(ezzt + ekkt) = a+ ψezzt + ψekkt.
4With the lagged data rule, the interest rate rule itself is a dynamic equation with a state variable it−1. In that
case we require two stable roots to yield determinacy.
5With the lagged data rule and the contemporaneous expectations rule, the PLM will be slightly diﬀerent since
agents do not possess knowledge of current data. See the appendix for details.
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Parameters Values Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
α 0.33 Capital share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ε/(ε− 1) 1.05 Level of markup
ω 0.75 Fraction of firms leaving prices unchanged
η 1 Elasticity of investment to Tobin’s Q
σ 1 Risk aversion
χ 1 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
Table 1: Calibration
Plugging this expression into (34), we obtain the T-mapping from (a, ψ)0 to combinations of the true
parameters of the model. The model is E-stable if ddτ (a, ψ) = T (a, ψ)− (a, ψ) have eigenvalues less
than 0. We derive the specific E-stability conditions for each interest rate rule in the appendix.
3.2 Benchmark Calibration
The system (33) has four dynamic equations and four variables. We cannot obtain analytical solu-
tions for either determinacy or E-stability. We therefore rely on numerical simulations to study the
properties of the equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the values we used for the benchmark calibration.
Most parameters are chosen to conform with parameters used in the literature. For example, the
discount factor is set at 0.99, the depreciation rate is set at 0.025, and the capital share in production
is set at 1/3. The steady state mark-up is set at a mild level of 1.05, which implicitly defines a value
for the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods, ε. The inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply, χ, is set to 1. The curvature of the utility function σ is set to 1 so that the utility is in
logarithm form. The fraction of firms that keep their prices unchanged, ω, is given a value of 0.75,
which corresponds to an average price duration of about one year. The elasticity of investment with
respect to Tobin’s Q, η, is set to 1, following King and Watson (1996).
The weights for inflation and output in the interest rate rule, φy and φπ, and the level of increasing
returns θ are left open so we can experiment with diﬀerent values.
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4 Determinacy and E-stability of Interest Rate Rules
In this section, we study the determinacy and E-stability of REEs under diﬀerent interest rate rules.
Since the results for the four variants of the Taylor rule bear some similarities, our strategy is to
closely examine the results for the contemporaneous rule, and then go over the results for the other
three variants briefly. To simplify exposition, we use the term “stable REE” to refer to an REE that
is both determinate and E-stable, and the term “active policy” to refer to an interest rate rule that
responds more than one-for-one to changes in inflation.
4.1 Contemporaneous Data Rule
In this section we consider the interest rate rule (19).
A standard New Keynesian model does not have endogenous capital. Therefore our first question
is whether or not adding capital alone will change the properties of the equilibrium. To answer this
question, we do a side-by-side comparison of a model with capital and a model without. The latter is
a special case of the model in section 2 and is essentially the same as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). In
both cases, the production function has constant returns to scale, and we keep all other parameters
identical when necessary. We vary the policy weights for output and inflation and examine the
properties of the REE for each combination of the parameters. The results are presented in Figure
1. We use a dark-colored star “*” to indicate that an REE is both determinate E-stable, a square
to indicate that an REE is determinate but not E-stable, and a light-colored circle “o” to indicate
that an REE is explosive.6 We left indeterminacy areas blank.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the REE properties of the model without capital. Not sur-
prisingly, the results are identical to those of Bullard and Mitra (2002). When the policy weight
for inflation is larger than 1, the REE is always determinate and E-stable. The Taylor principle
therefore guarantees the uniqueness and stability of the REE. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows
the results for the model with capital. We note that the stability area nearly coincides with that
6When the system is indeterminate, we do not examine the E-stability of the equilibrium, as in Bullard and Mitra
(2002).
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Constant returns without capital
Constant returns with capital
Figure 1: Properties of the REE with the contemporaneous data rule and constant returns. The
areas of determinacy and E-stability are marked dark. The areas of indeterminacy are left blank.
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of the top panel. Most of the determinate and E-stable regions require an inflation weight higher
than 1. When the inflation weight goes below 1, the required output weight must adjust upwards.
Moreover, a determinate REE must also be E-stable, and vice versa, since there is no region denoted
by squares or circles. The Taylor principle undoubtedly still guarantees stability in this case. We
hence conclude that adding capital alone basically does not change the equilibrium properties of the
model.7
Next, we examine the eﬀect of increasing returns to scale. As a first step, we fix the policy
parameters for output and inflation to be 1.5 and 0.5, as originally proposed by Taylor, and increase
the level of θ to see if the REE properties will change. We find that when θ is between 1 and
1.05, the REE remains determinate and E-stable. But when θ rises to 1.06, the system becomes
indeterminate and E-unstable. This is a first hint that the Taylor Principle might not lead to stable
equilibria with increasing returns.
To examine the issue more closely, we next study how the policy parameters φy and φπ aﬀect
the outcomes when increasing returns exist. We fix the level of increasing returns to be 1.09. We
choose this number for the benchmark experiment because it is the lower bound of the recent value
estimated by Laitner and Stolyarov (2004), and is the upper bound estimated by Basu and Fernald
(1994). Other values will be examined shortly. The results are presented in Figure 2.
The results are striking. With moderate increasing returns, the Taylor Principle no longer
guarantees stability: the area of indeterminacy and the area of determinacy and E-stability almost
exactly reversed when compared with the constant-return case. While the area of determinacy and
the area of E-stability still coincide, this area requires policy weights for inflation that are mostly less
than one. Contrary to previous studies, this suggests that an inactive monetary policy is appropriate
in terms of stabilizing the equilibrium.
One naturally wonders how the area of stability shifted from the right to the left as the level of
increasing returns changes. Next we plot a series of three graphs in Figure 3 to show the transition
7Dupor (2001) show that with endogenous capital, an active interest rate rule will render the REE indeterminate.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), however, point out that Dupor’s findings are largely due to the timing conventions in
the continuous time model he used. Our results confirm that Carlstrom and Fuerst are correct.
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Figure 2: Properties of the REE with the contemporaneous data rule and increasing returns. The
area of determinacy and E-stability is marked dark. The area of indeterminacy is left blank.
process. The level of returns to scale starts from 1.06 and increases at an increment of 0.01 in these
graphs. We can clearly see that as θ increases, an area of indeterminacy and E-instability is created
and gradually expands to the right and wipes oﬀ the stability areas on the right. In the mean time,
a stable area occurs on the left and slowly expands. The E-stability and determinacy areas always
coincide with each other, as in the case of constant returns (there is no area of squares).
In our analysis, we find that the level of markups, denoted by εε−1 , significant aﬀects the required
levels of increasing returns to generate indeterminacy. In our benchmark study, we set the markup
level to be 1.05. It turns out that if we lower the markup level, the REE is more likely to become
indeterminate. We show this finding in Table 2, where all results are obtained by setting the policy
weight for output to 0.5 and for inflation to 1.5. When the level of markup is 1.03, for example, an
increasing return of 1.04 is enough to generate indeterminacy. When the level of markup is 1.11, the
required level of increasing returns is 1.12. This suggests that if an economy has small markups, it
is more likely for the REE to be unstable.
The series of results have important implications for policy making. First, it is no longer safe
to implement the rule-of-thumb principle of reacting “more than one-for-one” to changes in the
inflation rates. As Figure 2 shows, when increasing returns are at a moderate level, the Taylor
16
Increasing returns: θ = 1.06
Increasing returns: θ = 1.07
Increasing returns: θ = 1.08
Figure 3: REE properties as returns to scale increase from 1.06 to 1.08. The areas of determinacy
and E-stability are marked dark. The areas of indeterminacy are left blank.
Markup Lowest increasing returns leading to indeterminacy
1.01 1.02
1.03 1.04
1.05 1.06
1.08 1.09
1.11 1.12
1.17 1.18
Table 2: Table Caption
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principle will exactly lead to an unstable equilibrium. Second, the designing of policy rules should
condition heavily on the status (level of increasing returns) of the economy. The combinations of
policy parameters that lead to determinate and E-stable vary as the level of increasing returns vary.
When θ is 1.06 (top panel of Figure 3), a strong response to inflation combined with a weak response
to output will almost always guarantee stability, but when θ is 1.09 (Figure 2), such a policy always
leads to instability.
In the next three sections we show that similar results hold for the other three variants of the
Taylor rule.
4.2 Forward Expectations Rule
We now turn to the interest rate rule (21).
Just as in the previous section, a first experiment shows that when θ = 1.06, the Taylor-suggested
policy weights 1.5 for inflation and 0.5 for output no longer guarantee stability. We therefore make
a side-by-side comparison of two diﬀerent REEs, one with constant returns, and the other with
increasing returns (θ = 1.09). The results are presented in Figure 4.
The top panel of Figure 4 displays the results for the case of constant returns to scale. The
plot is again almost identical to the no-capital case studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002). While in
general the stability area is smaller than the contemporaneous data case, a more than one-for-one
response to inflation combined with a moderate response to output still guarantee the determinacy
and E-stability of the REE. The lower panel of Figure 4 displays the results for the increasing returns
case. The conclusion is again reversed. With increasing returns, a less than one-for-one response to
inflation is required to obtain determinacy and E-stability of the REE. The smaller stability area
compared with the contemporaneous data case shows that an expectation-based rule is in general
less desirable.
4.3 Lagged Data Rule
We next examine the rule (20). We present the results in Figure 5.
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Constant returns
Increasing returns: θ = 1.09
Figure 4: Properties of the REE with the forward expectations rule. The areas of determinacy and
E-stability are marked with dark stars. The areas of indeterminacy are left blank.
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Constant returns
Increasing returns
Figure 5: Properties of the REE with the lagged data rule. The areas of determinacy and E-stability
are marked with dark stars. The Indeterminate areas are left blank. The determinate but E-unstable
areas are denoted by squares. The explosive areas are marked by light circles.
20
The top panel of Figure 5 shows the results for the constant returns to scale economy. With
a lagged data rule, it is no longer true that a determinate REE is always E-stable. Instead, two
new areas are introduced. The areas denoted by squares represent determinate equilibria that are
not E-stable. The areas denoted by light circles represent REEs that are explosive. While stability
seems harder to achieve, it is still true that the Taylor principle basically guarantees determinacy
and E-stability, as long as the weight for output is mild enough. The lower panel shows the results
for the increasing returns economy. As before, the small area of determinacy and E-stability violates
the Taylor principle and requires a less than one-for-one response to inflation. Active response to
inflation leads to either indeterminacy or explosive REEs.
4.4 Contemporaneous Expectations Rule
Lastly, we examine the economy with the rule (22). The results are presented in Figure 6.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) believe that the contemporaneous expectations rule is both practical
and desirable — practical because current data on output and inflation are generally not available
but can be estimated to form expectations, and desirable because it guarantees stability when the
policy weight for inflation is larger than 1. This can be seen from the top panel of Figure 6. The
large area of stability resides to right of the area where φπ is equal to 1. However, as we introduce
increase returns, the conclusion no longer holds. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 6, if we
increase the level of θ to 1.09, the area of stability switches to the left, just as in the previous cases
we studied. Now an active response to inflation will only lead to indeterminate or E-unstable REEs.
4.5 Discussion
When increasing returns are introduced, implementing the Taylor principle often leads to indeter-
minacy and E-instability. What explains this puzzling result? The key is to understand the role of
increasing returns in generating self-fulfilling business cycles.
When Benhabib (1998) first explains the intuition of indeterminacy, he uses the example of
sunspot-driven investment booms. When agents expect higher investment returns, they increase
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Constant returns
Increasing returns: θ = 1.09
Figure 6: Properties of the REE with the contemporaneous expectations rule. The areas of deter-
minacy and E-stability are marked with dark stars. The Indeterminate areas are left blank. The
determinate but E-unstable areas are denoted by squares. The explosive areas are marked by light
circles.
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investment and accumulate more capital. But with constant returns, the return of investment
(marginal product of capital) decreases with more capital accumulation, and the expectations of
higher returns will never be self-fulfilled. When increasing returns are high enough, however, more
capital will actually increase the return of investment and fulfill the earlier expectations. In our
context, this implies that with constant returns, we have the standard increasing marginal cost
curve; but with increasing returns, the firms operates on the part of the marginal cost curve that
decreases with the level of inputs.
The rest of the intuition is straightforward. In our model, the monetary authority’s job is to
dampen any fluctuations driven by inflation expectations. When consumers expect higher inflations,
the monetary authority responds by raising the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the
expected inflation rate. As a result, the real interest rate will rise, which in turn will curb the rise
in aggregate demand. With lower demand and a standard marginal cost curve, firms will cut their
prices — an action that goes against the earlier expectations of high inflation. This is why the Taylor
principle leads to a determinate equilibrium with constant returns to scale. If the firms operate
on the decreasing part of the marginal cost curve, on the other hand, lower demand will actually
lead them to increase prices, which exactly fulfills the consumers’ earlier expectations about high
inflation rates. This is why the Taylor principle leads to indeterminacy in the increasing returns
case.
5 Conclusion
This paper incorporates increasing returns into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with
capital. Within this framework, we re-examine the determinacy and E-stability of REE under four
variants of the Taylor rule studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002). While Bullard and Mitra (2002) find
that in most cases the Taylor principle is suﬃcient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability, we
find that with small increasing returns that are consistent with empirical estimates, these findings no
longer hold. In particular, some levels of increasing returns require a less-than-one-for-one response
of the interest rate rule to inflation to obtain determinacy and E-stability.
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The results in this paper suggest that designing the interest rule is much more complicated
than simply following a rule of thumb. In our context, a successful interest rule must condition
on the level of returns to scale of the economy. There is no reason to believe that the returns to
scale of the economy is constant over time. For example, when arguing about the existence of a
“new economy,” some researchers point out that the widespread usage of IT technology generates
additional externality eﬀect that gives rise to increasing returns. Our results suggest that the
monetary authority may well be required to adjust its policy with such changes to ensure market
stability.
This paper suggests that the types of interest rate rules that can maintain the stability of the
REE are diﬀerent when there are market failures in the economy. Given this result, opportunities
now exist for us to study other implications of increasing returns for monetary policy making. In
particular, we wonder what eﬀect increasing returns will have when the monetary authority designs
its interest rate rules by minimizing a cost function, either with discretion or with commitment. We
leave this for future research.
6 Appendix
In this section we derive the E-stability conditions for all four variants of the interest rate rules. We
re-write the system as
bzzt + bkkt = dkEtkt+1 + dzEtzt+1, (36)
kt+1 = ezzt + ekkt. (37)
The second equation is derived from the capital accumulation equation that does not involve any
expectations.
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6.1 Contemporaneous Data and Forward Expectations Rules
With the contemporaneous data rule and the forward expectations rule, the information sets available
for the learning agents are the same, therefore the E-stability conditions are similar. We assume
agents have the perceived law of motion (PLM)
zt = a+ ψkt,
which is in the same form as the MSV solution under REE. The parameter vectors a and ψ will
have to be learned. Given this PLM, we calculate the forward expectation of zt as
Etzt+1 = a+ ψEtkt+1 = a+ ψEt(ezzt + ekkt) = a+ ψezzt + ψekkt.
Plugging this into (36), we get
zt = (I −mez)−1b−1z dza+ (I −mez)−1(mek − b−1z bk),
where m = b−1z dk + b
−1
z dzψ. Therefore we obtain the T-mappings:
T (a) = (I −mez)−1b−1z dza,
T (ψ) = (I −mez)−1(mek − b−1z bk).
The REE solution consists of values a = T (a) and ψ = T (ψ). The E-stability of (a, ψ) is governed
by the local asymptotic stability of the matrix diﬀerential equation:
d
dτ
(a, ψ) = T (α,ψ)− (a, ψ).
The conditions for expectational stability of the REE solutions are addressed in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001, section 10.3). These conditions are that the eigenvalues of the matrices DT (a) and DT (ψ)
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all have real parts less than unity. The relevant matrices are:
DT (a) = (I −mez)−1b−1z dz,
DT (ϕ) = e0k ⊗Nb−1z dz − (ezNmek)0 ⊗N(−b−1z dz) + (ezNb−1z bk)0 ⊗N(−b−1z dz),
where N = (I −mez)−1 and a and ψ are evaluated at the steady state values.
6.2 Lagged Data Rule
With the lagged data rule
it = φyyt−1 + φππt−1,
the implicit assumption is that the agents do not possess knowledge of current data. Therefore the
perceived law of motion must be diﬀerent. If we plug the interest rate rule into the set of equilibrium
conditions, the system becomes
zt = FEtkt+1 +GEtzt+1 +Hkt−1 + Lzt−1,
kt = ezzt−1 + ekkt−1.
The PLM of the agents is
zt = a+ γzt−1 + ψkt−1.
Given this PLM, the T-mapping of parameters are derived as
T (a) = Feza+G(γa+ a),
T (γ) = Fezγ + Fekez + L+G(γ2 + ψez),
T (ψ) = Fezψ + Fe
2
k +H +G(γψ + ψek).
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The key matrices that determine the E-stability property of the REE are
DT (a) = Fez +G(γ + I),
DT (γ) = γ0 ⊗G+ I ⊗ (Gγ + Fez),
DT (ψ) = e0k ⊗G+ I ⊗ (Fez +Gγ).
6.3 Contemporaneous Expectations Rule
With the contemporaneous expectations rule
it = φyEt−1yt + φπEt−1πt,
our implicit assumption about agents’ information set is that they do not possess knowledge of
current data, and have to use past data to estimate today’s output and inflation. We can substitute
out the variable yt and re-write the interest rate rule as
it = fkEt−1kt + fzEt−1zt.
The system can be re-written as
git + bzzt + bkkt = dkEtkt+1 + dzEtzt+1,
kt = ekkt−1 + ezzt−1.
Plugging the PLM
zt = a+ ψkt−1 + γzt−1
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into the system, the system becomes
zt = FEt−1kt+1 +GEt−1zt+1 +Hkt−1 + Lzt−1 +Ma,
kt = ezzt−1 + ekkt−1.
Following the similar procedures, we derive the critical matrices as
DT (a) = Fez +G(γ + I) +M,
DT (γ) = γ0 ⊗G+ I ⊗ (Gγ + Fez − b−1z gfz),
DT (ψ) = e0k ⊗G+ I ⊗ (Fez − b−1z gfz +Gγ).
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